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Margulies: When Interpretive Communities Clash

WHEN INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES CLASH ON IMMIGRATION
LAW: THE COURTS’ MEDIATING ROLE IN NONCITIZENS’
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Peter Margulies*
ABSTRACT
Immigration law gains clarity through the lens of Robert
Cover's compelling work on law as a "system of meaning." Cover's
vision inspires us to consider immigration law as a contest between
two interpretive communities: acolytes of the protective approach,
which sees law as a haven for noncitizens fleeing harm in their home
countries, and followers of the regulatory approach, which stresses
sovereignty and strict adherence to legal categories.
Immigration law's contest between contending camps need not
be a zero-sum game. As Cover and Alex Aleinikoff observed in their
classic article on habeas corpus, a legal remedy can also be a
"mediating device." In immigration law, courts can serve this
mediating function by reconciling the values of protection and
enforcement.
This Article considers the mediating devices that courts can
employ on three salient immigration law issues: 1) the availability of
habeas corpus in expedited removal, which the Supreme Court rejected
in DHS v. Thuraissigiam; 2) judicial review of executive branch action,
such as President Trump's ban on immigration from several majorityMuslim countries, which the Court upheld in Trump v. Hawaii, and
President Trump's attempted rescission of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which the Court invalidated in
DHS v. Regents of the University of California; and; 3) procedural and
substantive bases for challenges to immigration detention.

*

Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate
University; J.D., Columbia Law School.
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In each context, the Article argues that courts should require
more tailored government actions and acknowledge the need for
workable enforcement. This approach preserves a measure of
deference for the political branches while checking arbitrary
government actions that put noncitizens at risk.
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INTRODUCTION

Seeing immigration law through the lens of the late Robert
Cover’s work yields insight, but also requires accommodation. 1
Cover’s conception of interpretive communities perpetually creating
law as a “system of meaning” aids in understanding two opposing
camps in immigration law: the “protective” approach and the
“regulatory” approach. The protective approach seeks to safeguard
survivors of persecution and torture, while the regulatory approach
stresses sovereignty, democratic process, and orderly law
enforcement.2 Based on Cover’s earlier work with Alex Aleinikoff,
courts can be a “mediating device” that reconciles the protective and
regulatory approaches.3
On the other hand, mining Cover’s work for these nuggets of
insight requires recognition that Cover’s work is both incomplete and
protean. Cover’s work is incomplete since the dichotomy between the
protective and regulatory approaches is not the stark struggle between
private meaning and bureaucratic imperatives that Cover posited in
Nomos and Narrative.4 Instead, conflicts between the protective and
regulatory approaches often demarcate different groups within
government, such as protective asylum officers versus regulatory
immigration enforcement officials. In addition, Cover’s resonant
account in Nomos and Narrative is most useful in tandem with the
judicial craft that Cover and Aleinikoff celebrated in their article on
habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court’s record is mixed in mediating between the
protective and regulatory camps in immigration cases.5 Due to the
overall deferential cast of the Supreme Court’s immigration
jurisprudence, the Court has often sided with the regulatory camp,
1

My focus here is on two works, one of which is co-authored: Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1983); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
2
Cover, supra note 1, at 12.
3
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1048 n.65 (citation omitted).
4
Cover, supra note 1, at 12.
5
Compare Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020)
(upholding statutory restrictions on judicial review), with Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents Univ. Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (holding that Department of Homeland
Security had not provided sufficiently reasoned explanation of rescission of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program).
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particularly in cases involving noncitizens with no previous ties to the
United States who are seeking to enter the country.6 Despite this
deference, a Supreme Court decision, Department of Homeland
Security v. Thuraissigiam,7 at least acknowledged the
intragovernmental battle between the regulatory and protective
camps.8 In Thuraissigiam, the Court held that noncitizens subject to
expedited removal lacked access to habeas corpus. However, in
writing for the Court, Justice Alito failed to adequately address serious
flaws in the regulatory approach's factual claims.9
Two other important recent decisions in which Chief Justice
Roberts wrote for the Court, Trump v. Hawaii10 and Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California,11 may
sketch the outlines of a work in progress. In the former case, Chief
Justice Roberts accepted the rationale of the Trump administration
regarding the travel ban on entry from a list of countries dominated by
those with majority-Muslim populations.12 In the latter case, Chief
Justice Roberts conducted a more robust inquiry into the Trump
administration’s rationale for seeking to rescind the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, this time finding the
administration’s rationales wanting. 13 This Article suggests that this
pivot may have been part of a Coverian process of mediation between
the regulatory and protective camps. The Article’s final case study
examines the importance of relief for detained noncitizens through the
lens of Cover and Aleinikoff’s work, suggesting that the Constitution
6

Compare Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 262 (noting judicial deference in
immigration law), with David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power
Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 44 (2015) (describing most persuasive
arguments for deference); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme
Court, 2009-13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 57, 61-62 (2015) (claiming that recent Supreme Court decisions showed a
curtailing of deference).
7
140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
8
Id. at 1966-67 (discussing more generous decisions of asylum officers as compared
with immigration judges).
9
See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s failure to
acknowledge the multiple causes of in absentia removals).
10
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
11
140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
12
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2403.
13
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents Univ. Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1902, 1906, 1912
(2020).
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requires some remedy for prolonged confinement of noncitizens who
have raised substantial questions about their removability. 14
This Article contains four Parts. Part I discusses Cover’s work,
including Nomos and Narrative, and the Cover and Aleinikoff study
of habeas corpus. Part II discusses Thuraissigiam and habeas corpus
for noncitizens with no previous ties to the United States. Part III
analyzes the pivot between Hawaii and Regents. Part IV discusses
remedies for prolonged detention. This article concludes with thoughts
on the future of judicial “mediating devices” in immigration law.
II.

NOMOS, NARRATIVE, AND INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES IN
IMMIGRATION

While Robert Cover did not examine immigration law in depth,
his work on groups creating “system[s] of meaning” suggests two key
contending groups in this fraught field: the protective and regulatory
camps.15 My goal in this paper is not to pick a winner in this battle.
Instead, this article illustrates how courts referee the contest, using
their decisional authority and control over remedies as “mediating
devices,” as Cover and Alex Aleinikoff suggested in another pathbreaking piece.16 Subsequent portions of this paper argue that courts
have failed to serve as either effective or impartial referees, although
the shift in method and tone from Hawaii to Regents may herald a
change for the better.
A.

Cover and Interpretive Communities

As Cover noted in his classic piece, Nomos and Narrative,
groups with divergent perspectives relate disparate narratives, from
which they draw different normative conclusions. 17 As Cover put it,
“every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its
moral.”18 Groups that organize themselves based on religion or
ideology develop a “strong” view of law—in the philosophical sense—

14

Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2021).
Cover, supra note 1, at 12.
16
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1048 n.65 (citation omitted).
17
Cover, supra note 1, at 5 (observing that, “[i]n this normative world, law and
narrative are inseparably related.”).
18
Id. at 5.
15
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“in which law is predominantly a system of meaning.”19 Cover cited
the Mennonites who submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme
Court supporting the prerogative of the segregationist sectarian
college, Bob Jones University, to discriminate on the basis of race.
According to Cover, the Mennonites’ understanding of the
Constitution “inhabit[s] an ongoing nomos”—a self-created legal
order.20 For Cover, that group-based understanding “assumes a status
equal (or superior) to . . . the understanding of the Justices of the
Supreme Court.”21 As “wielders of state power,” courts for Cover
“must establish their boundary with a religious community’s resistance
and autonomy.”22 Speaking of both government officials, including
judges, and private groups, such as the Mennonites, Cover explained
that, “[e]ach group must accommodate in its own normative world the
objective reality of the other.”23
B.

Mediation by Design: The Role of Federal Courts

If Cover’s work in Nomos and Narrative posits a dichotomy
between the vibrant constitutional visions of private groups and the
philosophically “weak” official view of law as order-maintenance, his
earlier work with Alex Aleinikoff on habeas corpus and federalism
presents a more pragmatic view. 24 In Cover and Aleinikoff's article,
courts are not merely bureaucrats. Instead, they display a defining
sense of craft that mediates between: (1) rights claims made by
criminal defendants and (2) the distinctive worlds of state law
enforcement officials and judges.25 Cover and Aleinikoff also
described the input that courts receive from the parties and other
stakeholders as creating a “forum for negotiation” for equitable
decrees, such as injunctions, which can require broad changes by state

19

Id. at 12.
Id. at 28; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
21
Cover, supra note 1, at 28.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 28-29.
24
By “weak,” Cover meant that the order-maintenance view did not make distinctive,
affirmative claims for the virtues of law as creating meaning; instead, believers in
the order-maintenance approach rely on generic claims about law as a means to
provide stability. Cover, supra note 1, at 12.
25
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1038.
20
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officials.26 Moreover, equity had a utopian element that made it
become a “midwife of constitutional innovation.”27
Nonetheless, pragmatic forces tempered equity’s role. As
Cover and Aleinikoff remarked, “a Court bent upon wholesale utopian
reform soon finds the political capital necessary to effectuate change
squandered, for it ignores the historical base from which change must
proceed.”28 Regarding doctrines such as abstention, standing, and
ripeness that limit the role of federal equitable decrees in state court
proceedings, Cover noted that the age-old individual remedy of habeas
corpus had become a proxy for broad-based equitable relief. 29 In this
space, courts used dialogue and “mediating devices” to impose change
while preserving institutional legitimacy. 30
Trade-offs were endemic to this pragmatic vision of the courts’
role in cases involving civil rights and liberties. Cover and Aleinikoff
explained that federal courts, as a practical matter, could not decree
acceptance of a "utopian" vision of justice in which rights were
absolute and unyielding.31 Instead, federal courts often had to temper
rulings to accommodate state governments' focus on law
enforcement.32 Although Cover’s later work, such as Nomos and
Narrative, seemed to express a measure of impatience with this
hedging, Cover and Aleinikoff viewed such “mediating devices” as
necessary. Political realities dictated this conclusion. An additional
factor was the constitutional standing of states, which have their own
role in creating legal meaning. 33
C.

Protective and Regulatory Communities in
Immigration Law

In immigration law, contending normative communities fall
into the protective and regulatory camps. This subsection discusses

26

Id.
Id. at 1039.
28
Id. at 1050 n.78.
29
Id. at 1041.
30
Id. at 1048 n.65.
31
Id. at 1052-54.
32
Id. at 1052-54.
33
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on
Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352 (2010)
(discussing the interaction between federal jurisdiction and political trends).
27
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the normative commitments of each group. Understanding those
commitments is necessary to craft an appropriate mediating role for
courts.
The protective camp seems to ensure that prospective
immigrants, especially asylum applicants, generally receive a safe
harbor in the United States. 34 The forces threatening this group are
multi-faceted, including persecution, torture, poverty, and climate
change.35 Under the protective view, the vast majority of persons
seeking asylum presumptively fit legal criteria, which officials should
construe liberally in initial screening to avoid false negatives—
applicants wrongly returned to countries where they may face
persecution, torture, or death. 36 In addition, adherents of the protective
approach advocate for the favorable exercise of discretion by the
executive branch to assist immigrants, even those who do not qualify
for asylum or other forms of statutory relief.37 The difficulties
encountered by the protective school are two-fold. First, the legal
requirements for asylum are daunting, since the process requires not
only a risk of harm but also requires that risk to share a connection to
one of five limited statutory categories. 38 Second, executive discretion
occurs against the backdrop of the comprehensive scheme of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), in which Congress has
carved out areas for relief and legal immigration but has also viewed
noncitizens outside of the enumerated categories as being subject to
removal from the United States. 39
34

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-40 (1987).
See Christopher R. Rossi, The Nomos of Climate Change and the Sociological
Refugee in a Sinking Century, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 613, 635 n.155 (2018).
36
Eunice Lee, Regulating the Border, 79 MD. L. REV. 374, 394-95 (2020).
37
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of
Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 22-25 (2015).
38
INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992). The five characteristics that
trigger asylum protection are race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and
membership in a particular social group. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).
39
The INA authorizes issuance of immigrant visas for specific groups such as
“immediate relatives” (IRs) of U.S. citizens; unmarried sons or daughters of citizens;
spouses, children, and unmarried sons and daughters of LPRs; married sons or
daughters of citizens, and siblings of citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2012)
(providing visas for IRs); 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(4) (providing other family-based
visas subject to yearly caps). The INA also sets aside limited numbers of
employment-based visas for persons with various skills and talents. See 8 U.S.C. §
1153(b). Scholars have commented extensively on the scope of executive discretion.
See Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential Stewardship,
35
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The regulatory camp is a convenient bookend for the protective
approach. This contrasting school of thought regards immigration
restrictions as safeguarding U.S. sovereignty through democratic
choices.40 In this account, the political branches determine criteria for
admission into the country—such as family reunification, job skills, or
flight from persecution—based on domestic and global factors,
including resource allocation, political stability, and legal duties to
refugees and others.41 In setting high levels of legal immigration based
on family and employment relationships, and by providing a safe
harbor for those fleeing persecution and torture, Congress has balanced
the benefits of immigration with the need to allocate resources to those
already in the United States.42 Entry into the United States by those
who do not fit into these categories upsets the balance that Congress
has struck.43 Indeed, a system that cannot effectively implement

Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105 (2014)
[hereinafter Taking Care of Immigration Law]; Peter Margulies, Rescinding
Inclusion in the Administrative State: Adjudicating DACA, the Census, and the
Military’s Transgender Policy, 71 FLA. L. REV. 1429 (2019) [hereinafter Rescinding
Inclusion in the Administrative State]; but see Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Supreme
Court 2020 Term: Foreword: Regime Change, 135 HARV. L. REV. 1, 95-108 (2021)
(arguing for broad executive discretion in immigration law); Adam B. Cox &
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458
(2009) (arguing that both the U.S. Constitution and the INA authorize broad
discretion by the executive branch to provide a range of benefits, including a reprieve
from removal and work permits, for noncitizens without a legal status); cf. Hiroshi
Motomura, Making Immigration Law, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2794, 2805-13 (2021)
(discussing Cox and Rodriguez’s treatment of executive discretion).
40
Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
1 (1984); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) (asserting that
admission of foreign nationals is a core “sovereign attribute . . . largely immune from
judicial control”) (internal citation omitted).
41
See SARAH SONG, Immigration and Democracy 65-69 (2019); cf. Martin, supra
note 6, at 44 ‘(outlining the most persuasive arguments for judicial deference to the
political branches). The division between protective and regulatory camps that this
Article posits is a heuristic, not a precise demarcation. For example, many scholars
of a protective bent accept that Congress has principal authority over immigration.
See Motomura, supra note 39, at 2805-06 (acknowledging Congress’s vital role).
42
Other scholars dispute this view, asserting that sovereign states lack an ethical
basis for choosing their own nationals over individuals from other countries, given
individuals’ lack of control over their place of birth. See ILYA SOMIN, Free to Move:
Foot Voting, Migration, and Political Freedom (2020).
43
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 178-82 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Congress’s choices will trigger a backlash and become an impetus for
calls demanding fresh limits. 44
Regulatory adherents pay particular attention to the problem of
fraud in various forms of relief from removal, including asylum. 45
Claims for asylum that are unfounded or fabricated comprise a
collective action problem: those who assert such claims may game the
system by persuading decision makers that unfounded claims have
merit. However, the prevalence of unfounded claims erodes the public
good of support for legal immigration. 46 Among the current Justices
of the Supreme Court, Justice Alito most frequently cites concerns
from the regulatory perspective about fraud or the breakdown of
immigration adjudication.47
Despite the importance of issues such as fraud and systemic
breakdown, there are risks in the regulatory approach. Adherents of
the regulatory approach may exaggerate the disruption that judicial
intervention would cause to immigration adjudication. 48 That
exaggeration unduly discounts the risk of false negatives in asylum
decisions, which could lead to a noncitizen’s arrest, torture, or death in
his or her country of origin.49 Left unchecked, this asymmetry between
concerns about systemic disruption and false-negative errors can
distort immigration law and policy. The rhetoric of the regulatory
approach can cloak efforts to curb access to asylum and chill other
forms of legal immigration specifically authorized by Congress.50 This

44

David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration
Laws, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 684-85 (2000); Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and
Removal: A White Paper, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 669 (1997).
45
David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 184 (1983) (explaining the
arduous task of confirming information from asylum applicants and the incentives
that exist for asylum applicants to embellish their claims); see also Maslenjak v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017) (noting the flagrant misrepresentation in
which an asylum applicant claimed her husband had been victim of persecution when
in fact he took part in wartime atrocities).
46
See Martin, supra note 45.
47
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1966-67 (2020);
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2290 (2021).
48
See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing gaps in Justice Alito’s
analysis of factors that cause in absentia removal orders).
49
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-41 (1987).
50
Lindsay M. Harris, Asylum Under Attack: Restoring Asylum Protection in the
United States, 67 Loy. L. Rev. 121, 156-60 (2020).
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dynamic threatens democratic decisions that the regulatory approach
purports to respect.
D.

The Importance of Judicial Stewardship

Courts practice a kind of stewardship to accommodate the
concerns of the regulatory and protective models.51 Stewardship
connotes a fiduciary obligation on the part of an agent to serve the
needs of a principal. In U.S. governance, from the start, the Framers
viewed government officials as having a duty to safeguard the
framework of the Constitution, including both democratic values and
the checks that the Constitution places on popular will. 52 Tempering
tendencies toward short-term thinking and encouraging deliberation
about long-term interests is key to the judicial task.53 In stewardship,
attention to methodology and judicial craft can be more important than
particular substantive commitments. Cover, in his work with
Aleinikoff on habeas corpus, echoed this impulse in discussing courts’
use of “mediating devices” to reconcile the interests of parties and
other stakeholders.54

51

See, e.g., Margulies, The Travel Ban Decision, Administrative Law, and Judicial
Method: Taking Statutory Context Seriously, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 168-69
(2019) [hereinafter The Travel Ban Decision]; Margulies, Taking Care of
Immigration Law, supra note 37, at 108-10 (discussing stewardship as applied to the
executive branch’s immigration decisions); Peter Margulies, The DACA Case:
Agencies’ “Square Corners” and Reliance Interests in Immigration Law, 2019 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 127, 127-28 (2019-2020) [hereinafter The DACA Case].
52
Alexander Hamilton invoked stewardship when he stated that “government ought
to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its trust.” See
The Federalist No. 23, at 155 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
53
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, at 469-70. Substantive interpretive
rules such as the rule of lenity, which counsels courts to construe criminal statutes to
resolve ambiguity in favor defendants, perform this task by encouraging clarity in
the legislative process and safeguarding reliance interests. Amy Coney Barrett,
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 143-45, 153-55
(2010) (discussing constitutional role of rule of lenity). In immigration and other
areas, presumptions against retroactive application of statutes serve a similar
purpose. See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 135-41 (1998); Nancy Morawetz,
Determining the Retroactive Effect of Laws Altering the Consequences of Criminal
Convictions, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1743, 1750-55 (2003).
54
See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1048 n.65 (citation omitted).
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The failure of the Supreme Court to reconcile the protective
and regulatory approaches is evident in Department of Homeland
Security v. Thuraissigiam,55 in which the Supreme Court held that
noncitizens apprehended at the border lacked access to habeas corpus
to contest their removal. 56 Justice Alito, writing for the Court, ruled
out any role for the courts in this context. He opined that the
Suspension Clause did not protect the noncitizen’s proposed remedy:
a new chance to apply for asylum to rectify alleged procedural flaws
in a previous adjudication of his asylum claim. 57 Despite this stark
ruling, Justice Alito’s discussion of the likelihood of error in asylum
adjudication addressed both protective and regulatory perspectives,
although Justice Alito tilted too far toward the regulatory approach.
Viewed against the backdrop of substantive immigration law,
which has long showed marked deference to the political branches’
decisions regarding noncitizens at the border, Justice Alito’s reasoning
was not a major departure. Noncitizens at the border may have
statutory rights that can provide an avenue to judicial review of a denial
of asylum.58 However, over a century ago, the Court held that, in cases
involving noncitizens seeking to enter the country who lack ties to the
United States, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within powers expressly conferred by [C]ongress, are due
process of law.”59 Call these noncitizens seeking to enter “outsiders,”
55

140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
Id. at 1974-75.
57
Id. at 1974. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer asserted that habeas corpus should
be available to redress manifest legal errors and wholesale violations of statutory
procedures involving applicants apprehended at the border; Breyer agreed that
Thuraissigiam had not alleged issues of this kind or degree. See id. at 1989-90.
58
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (providing for judicial review of certain asylum
decisions).
59
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (emphasis added). Professor
Kovarsky, who asserted in a provocative piece that Thuraissigiam marked a major
narrowing of noncitizens eligible for admission, failed to fully reckon with Ekiu’s
ironclad substantive limits on judicially-ordered relief. See Lee Kovarsky, Habeas
Privilege Origination and DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 121 COLUM. L. REV. F. 23, 38-39
(2021) (recognizing Ekiu’s substantive deference, but not conceding that
unconditional deference left the shell of habeas intact without any path to meaningful
relief). Professor Rodriguez also failed to acknowledge this point in her description
of Thuraissigiam as a “marked departure” from the Court’s immigration precedents.
See Cristina Rodriguez, Reading Regents and the Political Significance of Law,
56
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as opposed to noncitizens who have entered the United States, whom
this Article will call “insiders.” True, the Supreme Court had not held
before Thuraissigiam that noncitizen outsiders lacked access to habeas
corpus. Nevertheless, the nominal availability of habeas corpus to
noncitizens at the border prior to Thuraissigiam made no practical
difference to the noncitizen’s prospects for relief. Those prospects
were dim, given the Court’s posture of absolute substantive
deference.60 The Thuraissigiam Court’s holding that habeas was
categorically unavailable to noncitizen outsiders thus changed little. 61
Justice Alito’s discussion of the policy backdrop for his stark
approach echoed the concerns of the regulatory camp about the
protective approach’s excesses and their effect on U.S. sovereignty.
Justice Alito asserted that the statutory remedies already available to
noncitizens at the border tilted too far toward the protective camp. 62
On paper, those remedies are limited. Among noncitizens arrested at
the border, only asylum applicants who received a favorable credible
fear finding from an asylum officer have the opportunity to participate
in an in-depth, adversarial hearing with an immigration judge from the
Department of Justice, which is then followed by Article III appellate
court review.63 Without expressly citing the regulatory/protective
typology advanced in this Article, Justice Alito implied that asylum

2020(1) Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 21-22 (2021). As Justice Alito observed, Congress has
provided statutory remedies. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1966-67. The
noncitizen in Thuraissigiam sought access to habeas because he argued that the
statutory remedies were inadequate. Id. at 1995.
60
Moreover, this absolute substantive deference did not change when officials
stopped a noncitizen at a border and transferred that individual to the interior of the
United States for detention pending further proceedings. Under the so-called “entry
fiction,” courts had for over a century treated a noncitizen in this situation as if she
were still at the border awaiting entry. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230-31
(1925) (finding that a foreign national apprehended at the border, charged with being
inadmissible due to mental infirmity and then transferred to the interior of the
country, was “still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold
in the United States”) (emphasis added); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001) (affirming entry fiction); cf. Eunice Lee, The End of Entry Fiction, 99 N.C.
L. REV. 565, 575 (2021) (critiquing entry fiction and suggesting alternatives).
61
I suggest later in this Part that the Court should have preserved access to habeas
and modestly enlarged prospects for substantive relief, while still maintaining a
deferential substantive posture. See infra note 94-95 and accompanying text.
62
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
63
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(4).
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officers belonged to the protective camp. 64 Justice Alito revealed that
asylum officers find credible fear at a high rate, while immigration
judges in adversarial hearings grant asylum at a far lower clip. 65 Put
in Coverian terms, Justice Alito asserted that asylum officers have their
own nomos that centers on reducing false negatives in asylum at all
costs, including the cost of finding credible fear in many cases that
ultimately result in denial of asylum. According to Justice Alito,
resorting to habeas would compound the problem and further
marginalize the regulatory perspective. 66 Indeed, Justice Alito stated
that “the credible-fear process [even without judicial review] and
abuses of it can increase the burdens currently ‘overwhelming our
immigration system.’”67 Alito cited an almost 2,000% increase in
credible-fear claims and asserted that “[t]he majority have proved to
be meritless.”68 Furthermore, Justice Alito cited statistics on in
absentia removal orders.69 According to Justice Alito, these statistics
showed that thousands of asylum applicants annually abscond rather
than pursue their claims.70 Justice Alito’s discussion implied that
issuance of an in absentia removal order was a proxy for an unfounded
claim, which the applicant had “voted with her feet” not to press.71
Even though he did not use Cover’s terms, Justice Alito
compared the protective nomos of asylum officers with the regulatory
nomos of immigration enforcement. According to Justice Alito, both
the overly protective outlook of asylum officers and the potentially
exacerbating effects of judicial review would adversely affect
implementation of the INA. For example, Justice Alito claimed that
judicial review of asylum denials in cases that could not meet what he
called the “low bar” of credible fear “would augment the burdens” on
asylum adjudication.72 Moreover, Justice Alito’s language went
64

Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
Id. at 1967 (noting that in 2019, an asylum grant was the ultimate disposition in
only 15% of the credible fear cases eventually heard by immigration judges).
66
Id. at 1966 (observing that, “[a]s a practical matter . . . the great majority of asylum
seekers . . . do not receive expedited removal and are instead afforded the same
procedural rights as other aliens.”).
67
Id. (citation omitted).
68
Id. at 1966-67.
69
An immigration judge will issue an in absentia order after a noncitizen has failed
to appear for a hearing.
70
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
71
Id.
72
Id.
65
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beyond the philosophically “weak” view of efficient administration
that Cover ascribed to state officials. 73
Justice Alito’s language formed an ethical narrative driven by
the need to identify and deter noncitizens’ use of deception to game
the U.S. asylum system. 74 In the opening sentences of his opinion,
Justice Alito expressly linked this theme to concerns about
impingement on U.S. sovereignty, recounting that “[e]very year,
hundreds of thousands of aliens are apprehended at or near the border
attempting to enter this country illegally.”75 After acknowledging that
some of these noncitizens advance meritorious claims that require
recognition based on American “ideals and . . . treaty obligations,”
Justice Alito returned to his cautionary theme and warned that “[m]ost
asylum claims . . . ultimately fail, and some are fraudulent.” 76
Justice Alito’s observations were not unfounded. Some
noncitizens strategically use the asylum process to flee from harsh and
sometimes dangerous conditions, including those that do not meet
asylum law’s strict criteria. Specifically, at least 5% of cases, in a
system that currently has a backlog of 1.4 million pending applications,
could be fraudulent.77 Yet, the tone and substance of Justice Alito’s
analysis went beyond the generic “order-maintenance” view of law
that Cover ascribed to government officials.78 Justice Alito’s warnings
were grounded in sovereignty and prophecy, which gave the regulatory
camp an ethical aspect beyond a mere preference for efficient
management.
Despite his legitimate points about unfounded and fraudulent
asylum claims, Justice Alito was not sufficiently critical of the
regulatory camp’s premises. For example, issuance of an in absentia
73

See Cover, supra note 1, at 12.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1967 (noting the need to deter “fraudulent” claims
and the difficulty of doing so under current conditions; citing nonpartisan sources to
support this concern).
75
Id. at 1963.
76
Id.
77
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (2017); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-50, ASYLUM: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ASSESS AND ADDRESS FRAUD RISKS 3 (2015); see also Tarini Parti & Michelle
Hackman, Biden Administration Proposes Asylum Overhaul to Reduce Backlog,
Speed Deportations, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2021 1:31 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-administration-proposes-asylum-overhaul-toreduce-backlog-speed-deportations-11629307861 (discussing asylum backlog).
78
See Cover, supra note 1, at 12.
74
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removal order in a case does not necessarily indicate that the
underlying claim is meritless. Some noncitizens whom immigration
court statistics count as “absconding,” prompting the issuance of an in
absentia removal order, received defective notice of the time and place
of their hearing or the charges against them. 79 Moreover, the difficulty
of obtaining legal counsel also hampers noncitizens’ participation in
the process and their ability to support their claims. 80 When
noncitizens who have received in absentia orders retain counsel to
reopen proceedings, they are usually successful. 81 Justice Alito’s
examination of “meritless” or “fraudulent” claims and noncitizens who
“abscond” does not acknowledge these obstacles faced by noncitizens,
let alone suggest that the law should help redress such imbalances. 82
Justice Alito thus failed to reconcile the protective and
regulatory perspectives. To provide an appropriate “mediating device”
in a Coverian sense, Justice Alito should have brought means-ends
rationality to bear. The Court should have asked whether achieving
the goal of a workable immigration system required the drastic means
of preclusion of judicial review. Judicial stewardship would have
employed proper tailoring by asking whether any type of judicial
79

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2112 (2018); Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer,
Measuring In Absentia Removal In Immigration Court, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 817, 85152 (2020).
80
Eagly & Shafer, supra note 79, at 858-61; Zachary Manfredi & Joseph Meyers,
Isolated and Unreachable: Contesting Unconstitutional Restrictions on
Communication in Immigration Detention, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 130, 139-40 (2020);
see also Mark Noferi, Making Civil Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining
the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 27 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 533, 557
n.155 (2014) (analyzing recommendations on access to counsel for detained
noncitizens).
81
See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 76, at 856-57 (noting in the period studied,
immigration judges granted motions to reopen in 84% of cases where an in absentia
removal order had issued).
82
However, the regulatory perspective mounts a persuasive critique of unduly strict
notice requirements. In a recent decision, the Court required one-step notice that
included both information about the charges against the noncitizen and details about
the time and place of the hearing, even when sequential notice about charges and
scheduling did not prejudice the noncitizen. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474,
1486 (2021). As Justice Kavanaugh observed in a dissent joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, the statutory case for requiring one-step notice is weak.
Id. at 1487-91 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Peter Margulies, Textualism’s
Immigration Problem: Stabilizing Interpretive Rules on Noncitizens’ Rights and
Remedies, HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 39-44)
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=3918993).
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review could have deterred arbitrary agency decision making in the
expedited removal process while still retaining appropriate levels of
deference to the political branches. For example, the Court could
employ a variant of plain error analysis, which ensures that
administrative decisions are not wholly lacking in foundation while
also limiting review to claims of manifest mistakes of law. 83 In fact,
the Court has typically assured itself, as a practical matter, that
decisions about extradition and transfer have such a basis.84 Judicial
stewardship would have counseled a similar approach to expedited
removal.
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Thuraissigiam comes closer to
a Coverian ideal of balancing the needs of interpretive communities.
For example, Breyer discussed a hypothetical case of a noncitizen
apprehended at the border and placed in expedited removal. The
noncitizen referenced in Justice Breyer’s example later encountered
“rogue immigration officials [who] forged the record of a credible-fear
interview that, in truth, never happened[.]”85 Similarly, Breyer cited a
hypothetical case that demonstrated the manifest misapplication of the
relevant legal standard in asylum claims. 86 In this hypothetical
scenario, an asylum officer found that an asylum applicant claiming
persecution of the basis of his practice of Judaism simply did not

83

Justice Breyer recommended this approach. See Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1989
(Breyer, J., concurring).
84
Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of
Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 998-1003 (1998); Peter Margulies, The Boundaries
of Habeas: Due Process, the Suspension Clause, and Judicial Review of Expedited
Removal Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 405, 43338 (2019). Justice Alito rejected the extradition analogy, asserting that the habeas
petitioners in those cases sought release from custody, when continued custody
would have resulted in their prosecution in a foreign country. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1974-75 (2020). In contrast, the noncitizen
in Thuraissigiam sought a new hearing on his asylum claim. Margulies, The
Boundaries of Habeas, supra, at 433-36. But arguably the stakes for Thuraissigiam,
who alleged that he would be subject to persecution in his home country, were
equivalent to the stakes in the extradition cases. Id. at 1967. Justice Alito’s focus on
habeas as requiring a request for release obscured the parallels between the
extradition and expedited removal contexts. Id.
85
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1989.
86
Id.
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qualify for asylum as a matter of law.87 Justice Breyer, who was joined
by Justice Ginsburg, expressed concern that barring challenges to such
flagrant violations would provide an insufficient check on government.
From a Coverian perspective, Justice Breyer was correct.
IV.

A TALE OF TWO CASES: INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES IN
THE TRAVEL BAN AND DACA DECISIONS

Two recent decisions may reveal a pivot toward reconciling the
regulatory and protective perspectives. In Trump v. Hawaii, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, displayed the deference that has
long characterized the Court’s decisions on prospective entrants to the
United States.88 However, in Department of Homeland Security v.
Regents of the University of California, Chief Justice Roberts, who
again wrote the majority opinion, echoed the concern for noncitizens’
welfare characteristic of the protective approach, linking that concern
with the well-being of U.S. individuals and entities. 89 While one can
distinguish Regents as involving noncitizens already in the United
States, Chief Justice Roberts’s movement from deference in Hawaii to
a reconciliation in Regents is nonetheless notable.
A.

Deference toward the Regulatory Camp in the
Travel Ban Case

Deference prevailed in Trump v. Hawaii, in which the Supreme
Court upheld President Trump’s suspension of entry of nationals of
several Muslim-majority countries.90 The 2017 measure, which
followed two earlier attempts that encountered judicial resistance, 91
originated in then-candidate Trump’s campaign promise for a “total
Id. (positing hypothetical of “officials [who] denied a refugee asylum based on the
dead-wrong legal interpretation that Judaism does not qualify as a ‘religion’ under
governing law[.]”) (citing Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113, 119-20 (1924)).
88
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018).
89
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents Univ. Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1902, 1906, 1912
(2020).
90
The travel ban did not include the most populous majority-Muslim countries,
Indonesia and Pakistan, or the country that has the largest Muslim population, India.
Cf. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (noting that countries included in the travel ban
included “just 8% of the world’s Muslim population”). The ban also included North
Korea and officials in Venezuela and their families and associates. Id. at 2405.
91
Id. at 2403-04.
87
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and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States . . . .” 92
Chief Justice Roberts’s Hawaii opinion shows the tension between
uncritical acceptance of the regulatory view and a more skeptical
perspective that lurks at the opinion’s edges.
Chief Justice Roberts’s framing of the question at the start of
his opinion squarely credited the regulatory view’s premises and
viewed President Trump’s travel ban as consistent with those tenets.
Chief Justice Roberts described President Trump’s exercise of power
under § 212(f) of the INA to suspend the entry of persons the President
finds to be “detrimental to the interests of the United States” as a
logical corollary of the “vetting process” that any noncitizen seeking
admission to the United States must undergo to ensure public safety. 93
Conveying President Trump’s rationale in neutral terms, Chief Justice
Roberts explained that the countries subject to the ban “do not share
adequate information for an informed entry determination or . . .
otherwise present national security risks.” 94 Reinforcing this view of
the travel ban as a routine regulatory measure, Chief Justice Roberts
elaborated on how agencies that assisted in establishing the travel ban
participated in an inter-agency process of “consultation.” Consultation
occurs when flagged countries allegedly fail to provide adequate
“identity-management information,” including information on lost or
stolen passports.95 In concluding that this supposedly neutral and
reasoned agency process was consistent with both the INA, which
barred discrimination in visa issuances, and the Constitution’s
Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “such
judgments ‘are frequently of a character more appropriate to the
legislature or the Executive,’” rather than the courts.96
However, the framing of President Trump’s travel ban as a
routine regulatory action clashed with the Chief Justice’s apparent
92

Id. at 2417.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f); Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2403.
94
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2403.
95
Id. at 2404 (citation omitted).
96
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (barring discrimination “in the issuance of an immigrant
visa”); but see Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2413-14 (reading § 1152(a)(1)(A) narrowly to
distinguish between issuance of visa by consular official and entry decision made at
port of entry such as border, airport, or port); see also Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418-19
(citation omitted) (discussing importance of judicial deference). It is telling that
Chief Justice Roberts quoted here from a decision that addressed the far more
anodyne subject of congressional limits on receipt of benefits by noncitizens. See
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (cited in Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419).
93
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acknowledgement of the invidious stereotypes that spawned the travel
ban. Chief Justice Roberts conceded that a series of statements by
President Trump “cast[] doubt on the official objective” of the ban. 97
The opinion documented those statements, starting with thencandidate Trump’s call on the campaign trail for a “total and complete
shutdown” of Muslim immigration. 98 Chief Justice Roberts compared
Trump’s remarks unfavorably to those of presidents past, including
George Washington. As recounted by the Court, Washington used the
standing of the presidency to “espouse the principles of religious
freedom and tolerance on which this Nation was founded.” 99 Chief
Justice Roberts then described similar statements by modern
presidents, including Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush.100
Roberts’s survey of presidential statements from George
Washington to the present made sense only as an acknowledgment of
the discontinuity between Trump’s rhetoric and the language used by
Trump’s predecessors in the White House. The Chief Justice could
have readily framed Trump’s toxic rhetoric as a signal to
administration officials to do his bidding on the travel ban. Against
the backdrop of that powerful presidential signal, the patina of
interagency process that Chief Justice Roberts cited as proof of the
travel ban’s bona fides was merely “window dressing.”101
Nevertheless, despite the clear implication that Trump’s statements
represented a major falling-off from both Washington and more recent
occupants of the White House, Chief Justice Roberts asserted the need
for deference.102
Chief Justice Roberts could have applied more searching
means-ends scrutiny to the travel ban. For example, Chief Justice
Roberts could have asked whether the Administration’s vaunted
concern with identity management matched the means that the ban
97

Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417.
Id.
99
Id. at 2418 (citing Washington’s letter to Touro Synagogue in Newport, Rhode
Island, advising the Temple’s congregants that the U.S. government “gives to bigotry
no sanction, to persecution no assistance [and] requires only that [the congregants
and others of the Jewish faith] … demean themselves as good citizens”).
100
Id.
101
See id. at 2432-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing illusory nature of waiver
process under travel ban); id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (asserting that, due
to interagency process, Trump’s efforts to single out Muslims for harsh treatment
“now masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns”).
102
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418-19.
98
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employed. Precedents that applied a “rational basis with bite” test
provided ample precedent for this more probing view of government
decisions.103 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts cited several of those
cases.104 For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,105 the Court found no rational basis for a local ordinance that
required a special permit for establishment of a group home for persons
with developmental disabilities.106 The Court determined that the
ordinance was radically underinclusive as a means to achieve the
town’s stated goals of alleviating noise and congestion. As the Court
observed, the town had not required a special permit for other uses in
the area, such as fraternity houses, dormitories, and hospitals, that
might prompt comparable adverse impacts. 107 Once the Court found a
lack of fit between means and ends, only one plausible explanation
remained: impermissible animus.108
The travel ban suffered from a similar lack of fit between the
Trump administration’s stated goals and the means it had chosen to
achieve those goals. The ban was markedly over-inclusive.109 Four of
the listed countries—Iran, Libya, Somalia, and Venezuela—issued
electronic passports, which the Trump administration viewed as the
gold standard of passport control. 110 Moreover, according to

103

Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1317, 1319-33 (2018). The discussion in the text borrows from earlier work. See
The Travel Ban Decision, supra note 51, at 178-79.
104
See, e.g., Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 8182 (1975); R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 632, 635 (1996)).
105
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
106
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 448-50 (1985)).
107
Id. at 447-50.
108
Id.
109
The Travel Ban Decision, supra note 51, at 180-81; David J. Bier, Travel Ban is
Based on Executive Whim, Not Objective Criteria, CATO AT LIBERTY (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/blog/travel-ban-based-executive-whim-not-objective-criteria;
see also Brief for The Cato Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Trump
v.
Hawaii,
No.
17-965
(Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17965/39755/20180323095217542_Cato%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf
(discussing
sources).
110
ICAO PKD Participants, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. (ICAO),
https://icao.int/Security/FAL/PKD/Pages/ICAO-PKDParticipants.aspx.
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international law enforcement officials, Iran was “quite strong” in
sharing data on lost or stolen passports,111 while Libya, Somalia, Syria,
and Venezuela were not far behind. 112 The travel ban was also
noticeably under-inclusive on identity management. Almost one
hundred unlisted countries do not provide electronic passports.113
Moreover, over 150 unlisted countries are either stingy when providing
information or absolutely silent about passports that are lost or
stolen.114 Chief Justice Roberts could have readily found that the travel
ban failed to pass muster under the same means-ends analysis that the
Court applied in Cleburne. Yet, the Hawaii Court cited Cleburne
without applying Cleburne’s more searching approach.115
The failure of Coverian mediation in Hawaii extended beyond
the realm of noncitizens outside the United States that both Hawaii and
Thuraissigiam sought to place off-limits. Justice Kennedy, concurring
in Hawaii, characterized judicial nonintervention in this domain as
natural and inevitable.116 Unlike his stance in Boumediene v. Bush,117
a case about war-on-terror detainees’ access to habeas, Kennedy did
not see the Court’s approval of the travel ban as an act that emboldened
the political branches to overreach into other spheres that are closer to
home.118 However, the belief that some hermetic seal insulates the
zone of “outside” deference from the “inside” realm of accountability
has always been naïve. While the exigencies of particular situations
may dictate greater flexibility for the political branches, the categorical
separation that Hawaii and Thuraissigiam sought has encouraged
habits of overreaching in the executive branch. Furthermore, those

111

Bier, supra note 109, at 10.
Id.
113
Id; ICAO PKD Participants, supra note 110.
114
Bier, supra note 109, at 2; U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Passport
Fraud: An International Vulnerability (Apr. 4, 2014) (testimony of officials Alan
Bersin and John Wagner), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/04/04/writtentestimony-plcy-office-international-affairs-and-cbp-office-field-operations.
115
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420.
116
Id. at 2424 (describing the “substantial deference that is and must be accorded to
the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs”).
117
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
118
Id. at 765 (affirming courts’ role in denying political branches the “power to
switch the Constitution on or off at will”).
112
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habits inevitably find their way into the domestic arena.119 A measure
of the mediation that Cover and Aleinikoff urged is necessary in both
a foreign and domestic setting; certainly, the Court should not
preemptively signal that mediation is unnecessary in the outside
domain.
B.

Mediation in the DACA Case

The Supreme Court struck a different Coverian balance in
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, in holding that the Trump administration’s effort to rescind
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program failed
to comport with the “reasoned decisionmaking” required under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).120 The Court’s robust use of
APA review in Regents contrasted sharply with the deferential
approach to the INA implemented in Hawaii. Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion highlighted the values of the protective camp. Roberts's
opinion also carefully scrutinized agency claims invoking the
regulatory position.
Chief Justice Roberts cited to the reliance interests of the
DACA recipients, including their commitment to life-building
activities such as education and service. 121 Under the APA, an agency
must engage in “consideration of the relevant factors” and address
“important aspect[s] of the problem” at hand. 122 Consider a DACA
recipient who enrolled in a four-year college in September of 2016 and
whose two-year DACA period of participation was due to end on

See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575-76 (2019) (finding that
Department of Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross’s rationale for seeking to add
citizenship question to census was “contrived” and that “the evidence tells a story
that does not match the explanation the Secretary gave for his decision.”).
120
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents Univ. Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020)
(quoting Michigan v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015)). Under DACA,
recipients who came to the United States as children within specified times and are
not above thirty years of age at the time of their application receive important
benefits, such as a reprieve from removal and eligibility for a work permit. Id. at
1901-05.
121
Id. at 1914. This discussion borrows from earlier work. See The DACA Case,
supra note 50, at 149-50.
122
Regents Univ. Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 at 416 (1971)); id. at 1913 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
119
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March 6, 2018. According to Chief Justice Roberts, this recipient
would be “caught in the middle of a time-bounded commitment,”
without either sufficient notice of DACA’s rescission to avoid starting
her course of study or sufficient time to fulfill degree requirements. 123
Chief Justice Roberts described a similar predicament for persons
serving in the armed forces or receiving an extended course of needed
medical treatment. According to Roberts, Duke could have considered
allowing our hypothetical college student and similar “caught in the
middle” recipients to complete their respective periods of study,
treatment, or service.124
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts noted that rescinding DACA
would have had spillover effects for U.S. individuals and entities, such
as employers, schools, and the U.S. military. 125 Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion alluded to a sense of mutuality that is implicit in
Cover’s explanation of the nomos—the notion that all of us share a
project of making meaning, even though our respective projects may
entail different values and guiding premises. 126 This brings DACA
recipients, the so-called “Dreamers,” within the ambit of a Coverian
interpretive community.
In Chief Justice Roberts’s Regents opinion, the APA served the
same mediating function as habeas did in Cover and Aleinikoff’s
work.127 Rather than extend substantive statutory or constitutional
rights to DACA recipients, Chief Justice Roberts stressed the process
values protected by the APA’s requirement of reasoned decision
making.128 He agreed that the agency could end both prongs of DACA:
its reprieve from removal and eligibility for work permits.129
However, in a framing exercise that owed much to the tradition of
equitable discretion described by Cover and Aleinikoff, the Chief
Justice suggested that the Secretary of Homeland Security had

123

Id. at 1914.
Id.
125
Id. (citing reliance interests of third parties with ties to DACA recipients).
126
Cover, supra note 1, at 12.
127
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1048 n.65.
128
Id. at 1912-13. Chief Justice Roberts did not directly dispute the assertions of
Justice Thomas in his dissent, which drew from the regulatory camp’s premises. Id.
For Justice Thomas, the INA did not authorize the comprehensive relief DACA
provided to noncitizens who lacked a legal basis for remaining in the United States.
Id. at 1921-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129
Id. at 1910 (majority opinion).
124
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discretion to consider alternative means for ending DACA and
discussed the impacts of each of those alternatives.130
In the words of Cover and Aleinikoff, the Secretary had failed
to mediate between the protective and regulatory camps. In Regents,
the Court held the Secretary to that mediating objective. While both
the Court’s role and the Secretary’s mission were more minimalist than
the expansive judicial pronouncement that Cover expected from the
Court in the Bob Jones case, Regents was still a lifeline for the DACA
program and its recipients.131
IV.

DETENTION AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

Finally, I will address the Coverian implications of relief
regarding immigration detention. A range of noncitizens are subject
to mandatory detention, including those who have committed offenses

130

Id.
As of the writing of this Article, DACA faces new challenges, including a district
court decision echoing Justice Thomas’s view that DACA exceeds power delegated
to the executive branch under the INA. See Texas v. United States, No. 1:18-CV00068, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133114, at *72-98 (S.D. Tex. July 16, 2021). In
earlier work, while acknowledging these arguments, I have argued that DACA merits
special deference as an exercise of traditional hardship-based deferred action under
the INA because of the youth of its recipients, their lack of ties to any other country,
and their lack of control over parental decisions to enter the United States. See
Margulies, Rescinding Inclusion in the Administrative State, supra note 51, at 147273. Moreover, DACA is also consistent with the exercise of presidential power under
the Constitution. See Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law, supra note 51, at
142-77 (arguing that in light of Congress’s silence and the foreign-affairs
consequences of removing large groups of noncitizens with no ties to any foreign
state, DACA fits the President’s provisional power to protect current and intending
citizens); see generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing gradations of judicial deference to
presidential power, with deference highest when the President and Congress act
together; at a middle stage when Congress is silent; and “at its lowest ebb” when the
President acts in opposition to Congress); id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(asserting that pattern of legislative acquiescence can provide “gloss” on presidential
power beyond Constitution’s stated authorities that should trigger judicial
deference); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 657-58 (1981) (upholding
presidential claims settlement as established practice in which Congress has
acquiesced); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 415 (2012).
131
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that make them removable. 132 In non-immigration settings, detention
with no prospect for release would trigger judicial intervention. 133 For
certain immigration detainees, Congress has both precluded release as
a substantive matter and curbed judicial remedies in a fashion that
echoes the regulatory approach. In particular, Congress has curbed
access to both injunctive and class-wide relief.134 Courts have sought
to balance the Government’s commitment to the regulatory approach
with rulings that recall the protective approach. 135
Mandatory detention is problematic for several reasons. First,
it is often needless since immigration officials could release many
immigration detainees under appropriate conditions that would
facilitate their appearance at subsequent hearings.136 Needless
curtailment of liberty prompts tension with due process. Second,
detention adversely affects a noncitizen’s ability to defend against
removal.137 Due process would also generally disfavor needless
impediments to a noncitizen’s ability to seek relief on the merits. 138

132

See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847 (2018);
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959. (2019).
133
Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 978 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f); id. at § (e)(1)(B).
135
See Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice, 109 CAL. L. REV. (Feb.
22, 2021) (manuscript at 36-38); Aditi Shah, Constitutional and Procedural
Pathways to Freedom from Immigration Detention: Increasing Access to Legal
Representation, 35 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 181, 199 (2020).
136
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) (authorizing release on bond subject to “conditions
prescribed by[] the Attorney General” or his or her designates); see also Johnson v.
Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2295 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining
that at a bond hearing, an IJ will decide whether the noncitizen is likely to abscond
and will deny bond if the noncitizen presents a flight risk).
137
Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Robert
Katzmann, When Legal Representation is Deficient: The Challenge of Immigration
Cases for the Courts, 143 DAEDALUS 37, 43-44 (2014)) (observing that compared
with non-detainees, detainees find it more difficult to obtain counsel to develop a
legal claim); Manfredi & Meyers, supra note 80, at 139-40; Noferi, supra note 77, at
557 n.155.
138
The Supreme Court has upheld mandatory detention for certain cohorts of
noncitizens who are currently in removal proceedings. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 531 (2003). In a concurrence in Demore, Justice Kennedy suggested that an
“unreasonable delay” by immigration officials in conducting a removal proceeding
might suggest some kind of improper penal purpose. Id. at 532-33. However, Justice
Kennedy declined to find such a delay in Demore. Id. at 533; but see Amy Greer,
Giving Joseph Hearings Their Due: How to Ensure that Joseph Hearings Pass Due
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Informed by the protective paradigm, courts have explored
creative ways to reduce these impacts and other harms of detention.
Some decisions found that Congress did not preclude access to habeas
corpus to challenge certain conditions of confinement, such as unsafe
practices in light of COVID-19.139 Courts have also ordered relief on
an individual basis.140 In addition, courts have used declaratory relief
to set procedures that must be followed in all similarly situated
cases.141 Unless officials are willing to run the risk of a court
ultimately finding them in contempt of court for failing to comply on
a class-wide basis with the terms of declaratory relief, this relief
functions much like an injunction.
Courts have used declaratory relief adroitly. For example, in
Gayle v. Warden, Monmouth County Correctional Institution,142 the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued declaratory relief
requiring procedural safeguards for a class of noncitizens subject to
mandatory detention. According to the court, in each case in which
the government asserted that mandatory detention applied, the Due
Process Clause required the Immigration Judge to hold a hearing prior
to adjudicating the merits. 143 At this preliminary hearing, the
government had to bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that noncitizens, by virtue of their prior criminal convictions,
fell within the group of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention
under the INA.144 The Third Circuit recognized that injunctive relief
was unavailable for the class.145 However, the court's declaratory relief

Process Muster, 26 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 40, 51-52 (2021) (discussing
unreasonable duration of detention in many immigration cases).
139
Nicole B. v. Decker, No. 20-7467 (KM) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126753, at *1517 (D.N.J. July 20, 2020); Yanes v. Martin, 464 F. Supp. 3d 467, 474 (D.R.I. 2020)
(interpreting Eighth Amendment to require individual bail hearings when facility
could not check COVID spread).
140
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (providing that injunctive relief is not barred “with
respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien”).
141
Gayle v. Warden, Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 331-34 (3d Cir.
2021). In Jennings, Justice Alito suggested that under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, declaratory relief might not “sustain the class on its own.”
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 851 (2018). If the prospect of contempt is
added to the mix, plaintiffs should be able to make this showing.
142
12 F.4th 321(3d Cir. 2021).
143
Id. at 332-34.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 336-37.
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provided clear procedural guidance that the government would be wise
to follow. The government's only alternative, assuming the Third
Circuit's decision is final, would be contesting the requirement of a
preliminary hearing in future cases. These repeated contests would be
unavailing, given the court's clear guidance. One hopes that the
government would instead participate in all future preliminary
hearings by shouldering the burden of proof that the Third Circuit had
specified.
If the government complies with this procedural guidance, the
effect of the Gayle court's remedy will approximate the impact of
class-wide injunctive relief. Both declaratory and injunctive relief
would result in a preliminary hearing on the need for mandatory
detention. Individual outcomes in release proceedings will vary.
Depending on the facts and law in each case, some detainees will be
released, while others will remain in detention. The range of
substantive outcomes is endemic to any procedural safeguard;
however, while outcomes will be varied, adoption of the procedural
safeguard would be uniform. In response to mandatory detention,
courts thus have supplied the “mediating devices” that Cover and
Aleinikoff had envisioned.146
V.

CONCLUSION

Surveying this case law, one can see that the Supreme Court
has not used “mediating devices” as deftly as Cover and Aleinikoff
recommended.147 The analysis of Justice Alito in Thuraissigiam
reveals the flaws in distinctions between persons “inside” and
“outside” the United States. 148 Maintaining judicial review as a check
on arbitrary decisions benefits insiders, not just outsiders. As Trump
v. Hawaii and Regents illustrate, “outside” distinctions and
classifications do not stay “outside.” 149 Instead, they migrate inside
and erode reasoned decision making. Regents exhibited one approach
to correcting the balance between the regulatory and protective camps.
Despite the thin character of reasoned decision making under the APA,
this safeguard would check arbitrary decisions on entry and

146

Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 1, at 1048 n.65 (citation omitted).
Id.
148
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1966-67 (2020).
149
See supra Part II.
147
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admissibility, as well as those about persons, such as DACA recipients,
who are “already” here. In cases like Hawaii, reasoned decision
making would require some measure of means-ends analysis that the
Court gestured at but failed to provide.
At the same time, Justice Alito’s account of the regulatory
perspective in Thuraissigiam raised important issues. Justice Alito
acknowledged factors that a mediating institution, like the judiciary,
should consider, including the backlog in asylum adjudication and the
role of fraud.150 These are not data points that the protective camp
typically acknowledges. 151 However, these factors are part of the
reality in any high-volume litigation regime, including immigration.
Understanding these factors is vital for a comprehensive understanding
of immigration law.
Just as Justice Alito could have tailored his analysis to the
values of the protective camp, the protective camp would do well to
understand the incentives for delay and the incidence of fraud in U.S.
immigration adjudication. That may not allow one camp to triumph,
as each hopes to do in Cover’s account of nomos.152 Moreover, courts
should recognize that the government is a “them, not an it,” with
contending factions that seek to further their own agendas.153 A total
triumph of either side’s agenda would destabilize the system, hindering
the progress toward inclusion sought by the protective camp and the
respect for enforcement that the regulatory approach promotes.
Instead, a more balanced dialogue would best serve the interests of all
parties, including legislators, executive branch officials, courts, and
immigrants themselves.

150

Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1967 (2020).
Among immigration scholars, only David Martin has consistently acknowledged
the issue of fraudulent claims. See Martin, supra note 43, at 184. Other scholars
tend to mention fraud, if at all, in conjunction with dismissals of extreme versions of
the regulatory paradigm, such as the Trump administration’s pronouncements. See,
e.g., Laila Hlass, The Adultification of Immigrant Children, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
199, 227 n.225 (2020) (quoting statement of Trump administration official that
stressed “loopholes” in immigration law, including those that permitted “aliens” to
assert “fraudulent asylum claims”).
152
Cover, supra note 1, at 28.
153
See Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive
Branch is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 212-16 (2011).
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